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The epistemic project of the
addicted brain: Towards a
socio-historical understanding
Matilda Hellman
University of Helsinki, Finland
“This tiny bit of the brain could offer clues about
addiction. It’s responsible for getting you to stop
doing things”, reads the headline in the most
viewed piece on the phenomenon of addiction
on Google News in December 2017 (Wetsman,
2017). The article goes on to explain that new
research“points to a small areaof thebrain, called
the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(rVLPFC), as the region responsible for taking
in contextual information (like the spider) and
using it to update the original plan”. The discov-
ery of this area for contextual decision-making is
presented as a clue to solving addiction problems.
An audit of hundreds of media items by my
colleague confirms that this is a very typical
way of media reporting on addiction in today’s
world. Sequences of information – some corre-
lations of intent and areas in the brain – are
made to represent revolutionary knowledge that
can solve the problem and mystery of addiction.
For an ordinary reader it is impossible to know
how well grounded the excitement over a find-
ing such as the one of the ventrolateral prefron-
tal cortex really is.
Professor Emeritus of pharmacology Harold
Kalant is among those who have expressed
great concern over the promises made by
brain-based understandings of addiction. He
has long remained firmly sceptical towards
the use value of findings by addiction brain
science. For example, he points out that most
of the research concerning the brain changes
presumed to underlie addiction has not even
been able to prove convincingly the presence
of addiction in its experimental subjects
(Kalant, 2015, p. 54). According to Kalant, it
is impossible to explain and understand
addiction by pursuing “the analytical study of
drug interactions with the nervous system at
ever-finer levels of molecular structure and
function” (2010, p. 787).
The addicted brain has raised a legion of
other questions. These have concerned basic
reliability and validity issues, such as the nature
of brain images as evidence, or, the reductionist
foci on one motivational impulse, such as crav-
ing or cue dependency. The critique that has
viewed the praxis of the addiction neuroscience
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in a principle societal framing has often ended
up confirming the asymmetry between the
many ethical concerns about and limited con-
tribution of the research in view of the enor-
mous amounts of funds invested in it (for
critical discussions, see, e.g., Carter & Hall,
2011; Miller, Carter, & De Groot, 2012).
When the excitement and the critique are
viewed as parallel trends, the observer may
wonder if it is all part of a great scam. And in
which case, on whose part?
In this editorial I will propose two ways that
can help us understand the rise of the addicted
brain and the discussion that surrounds it. These
entail stepping out of and stepping into the
“epistemic state of nature”, within which we
seek true beliefs and knowledge on the phe-
nomenon that we are trying to define (Fricker,
2011, p. 56). The “stepping out” can be
achieved by a socio-historical view on the Brain
Disease Model of Addiction (BDMA) and its
surrounding discussion. This can help us unfold
the context in which brain-based addiction
materialises in our collective consciousness.
The “stepping in” involves re-situating our-
selves as addiction researchers as part of the
actual phenomenon of addiction. The ways in
which the field of addiction research has pro-
gressed as an academic field may explain why
we are rather unprepared to take on the great
debates surrounding the BDMA. In fact, the
research field’s own modus operandi is likely
to be the reason why the addicted brain has
reached its current position and saturation in the
first place.
The Addiction Theory Network
The ethical concerns involved in the promised
and actual use of brain-based findings have
raised great concerns among scholars in the
field of addiction research. A recent initiative
to discuss the influential position of the BDMA
has been taken by the Addiction Theory Net-
work (ATN), founded in 2016. The initiators
are the UK-based addiction psychologists Nick
Heather and Derek Heim. The ATN group first
gathered as signatories behind a letter to the
editor in Nature by Heim et al. (2014), protest-
ing against the claim that there was a consensus
among scientists of addiction as a chronic relap-
sing disease which changes the structure and
function of the brain.
The ATN describes itself as “opposing the
dominant influence of the BDMA and collabor-
ating to develop alternative ways of understand-
ing and responding to addiction” (Heather et al.,
2017, p. 1). It has over 90 members, who, at
times, conduct rather lively discussions on an
email list. The network consists of scholars and
researchers with different backgrounds, mostly
in the field of addiction, all of whom share a
concern about the extent of influence given to
the BDMA. During 2017 the ATN arranged dif-
ferent kinds of sessions at conferences and
events, and several of its members have written
editorials, papers, and think pieces about the
nature of the phenomenon of addiction (cf. Fen-
ton &Wiers, 2017; Heather, 2018). It is indeed a
welcome forum for ventilating views and enga-
ging in some principle discussions that urgently
need to be acknowledged.
The “theory” part of the network’s name is
to be understood in heuristic terms: the discus-
sion has thus far concerned mainly the ways in
which to understand the phenomenon of addic-
tion in a truthful, knowledge-based and worth-
while way. In an editorial with six summary
chapters in the journal Addiction Research &
Theory, the ATN has announced the European
launch of the network (Heather et al., 2017).
The argumentation of the authors pertains to
such aspects as the social recovery experience
as challenging the brain-based view on addic-
tion; the inconsistency in the claims of involv-
ing obesity (¼food) in the addicted brain;
problematising the autonomy and competence
view in the BDMA and how personal empow-
erment is excluded; and the concept of disorder
as trivialising and inherently morally invested.
The editorial concludes that it is clear that
“there are a range of views on what is wrong
with the BDMA, both from a strictly scientific
perspective and from a consideration of its
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consequences for the avoidance and reduction
of harm due to addiction” (Heather et al., 2017).
The discussion by the network has thus far
come to reflect the epistemic agents participating
in it by concerning mainly the ontology of the
phenomenon under study (addiction). For debat-
ing the contribution of the BDMA for furthering
society on a principle level, the current focus of
the discussion may however be insufficient. We
might need to step out of our evidence-
producing machinery for a while and reflect on
the developments in a socio-historical context, to
address the question: why are we having the
discussion on the BDMA in the first place?
Stepping out: A socio-historical
framing
To understand why certain views on addiction
appear and achieve saturation in different times,
one can apply a framework of a Foucauldian
sociology of knowledge. Here, epistemic views
are seen as part of governance regimens intrin-
sically linked with transformations in the
rationalities and technologies of political power
in advanced prosperous liberal democracies.
Science and technology have of course long
been firmly located within the political arena
because of their central concern to the state, and
to all governance and power exercise.
A case in point of how such a Foucauldian
perspective has been fruitful in the past is Harry
Levine’s classic article on the discovery of
addiction (1978). In this, he accounts for how
the idea of alcohol as a problem appeared (in
North America) as entangled with certain socie-
tal developments as well as with circumstances
in the history of ideas and concepts. Definitions
of habitual drunkenness were shaped by devel-
opments in thought about deviance in general
and by an ideology of “inner reference” (cf.
Fraser, Moore, & Keane, 2014, p. 5, referring
to Carr, 2010). In the 19th century, the concept
of addiction started to be interpreted by people
in the light of their struggles with their own
desires. Levine argues that this was something
new since during the colonial period most
people had not been especially concerned with
drunkenness; drunkenness was just a natural,
harmless consequence of drinking. It was post-
colonial temperance that started to define
drunkenness as a problem and articulating the
need to drink as “inner directed”.
The idea of addiction made sense not only to
drunkards, who came to understand themselves
as individuals with overwhelming uncontrolla-
ble desires, but also to the middle classes, who
were struggling to keep their desires in check.
“[It] seemed a completely reasonable idea that
liquor, a substance believed to weaken inhibi-
tions when consumed (intoxication), could also
deprive people of the ability to control their
behavior over the long run (addiction)”,
explains Levine (1978, p. 165). The idea made
rational sense to people at this time and place
and was therefore internalized into collective
views on the problem. Today, references made
to the notion of addiction are normalised as part
of everyday life and the phenomenon is seen as
“naturally given” (Chandler, 2002, p. 235).
In order to achieve the same long-view per-
spective on today’s addiction ideas, we can pre-
tend that we have stepped 50 years into the
future and are now looking back to the 2010s
and 2020s. By then, we might be better
equipped to articulate the liberalistic science-
entangled developments that have, together
with certain epistemic dogma and technological
advances, been orienting our fascination over
brain-based addiction. We might be able to
view the BDMA as a mythology that has a cul-
tural function just as the “inner will struggle”
view of addiction in temperance thought. Per-
haps as an idea construct that we need and breed
because of the socio-political reality we live in.
No doubt, the fragmented saga of small
areas of the brain that can be repaired to make
us better people germinates in times of belief,
trust and hope in great scientific innovations.
At a time when humans are much more likely
to die of lifestyle-related “self-inflicted”
health problems than of violence, famine, or
war, the flagship project for humanity has
become to outwit disease and death, to regulate
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ourselves on an advanced molecular level of
governance. It is a comforting thought that
white-coated people in laboratories innovate ser-
ums and devices that will prolong our lives, and
can help us develop our bodies into cyborgs over
which we have more or less control.
My intentions are not to claim that brain-
based knowledge could not offer possibilities
to cure illness and improve our wellbeing. But
the point I am trying to make concerns the great
socio-historical opening for a power allocation
through which subjects are defined and governed
through the human organ of the brain. Just as in
the situation that Levine accounts for, the history
of addiction ideas has now reached a stage when,
for different cofounding reasons, the brain-based
model is likely to have great popular penetration.
It makes sense in our understandings of who we
are and where our problems stem from. And
there are enough resources and technologies for
allowing us to view it as a realistic way of sol-
ving the problems of addiction.
Levine (1978) also discusses Riesman,
Denny, and Glazer (1950), who have charac-
terised the property-owning middle class in the
18th century as “inner directed”. This refers
both to the particular way in which conformity
was assured, and to a concern with the integrity
and inner experiences of the individual. Thus,
the distinctively middle-class literary form, the
novel, made its domain the exploration of the
nuances of daily life and inner experiences
(Riesman et al., 1950). The novel became a
place where the inner struggle of the drunkard
was portrayed. The rise of middle-class society
was the precondition for a literature that incor-
porated narratives of everyday experience, and
it was also a precondition for the new way of
seeing the drunkard. The novel was a cultural
genre that served the individualised inner strug-
gle of addiction, in the same manner as we
sometimes speak of the television talk show
format of the 1980s and 1990s serving a ther-
apeutisation and psychologisation of society.
If the novel offered a place to scrutinise life
trajectories and change in the 18th century, the
saga of prosperous digitalised societies not only
enables the story of addiction from a therapeu-
tic and individualised perspective, but also
involves bits and pieces of a science fiction
mythology based on the fascination over the
discovery of the “tiny bit of the brain” that
“could offer clues about addiction”. What role,
then, has the field of addiction science played in
the historical developments of incorporating the
brain-based governmentality? If one way of
understanding the rise of the BDMA is to see
it as anchored in a socio-historical extrem-
positivistic and technologically advanced mode
of bodily governance, another way of approach-
ing the question is to see it as entangled with
developments in the field of addiction research.
Stepping in: Scientific practice
With so-called addiction-related behaviours –
excessive appetites, dependency, compulsions,
or whatever we choose to call this bundle of
phenomena – the main trait of problem defini-
tions can be traced to the dominant ways of
approaching the questions scientifically. An
archaeology into how this knowledge field has
progressed, not only involves a necessary self-
reflexive understanding of who we are as scien-
tists articulating the nature of the phenomenon
and how we choose to approach the phenomena
of our inquiries. It also entails the necessary
awareness of the fact that we cannot disentangle
ourselves from the things we describe, but we
are part of the phenomenon and are thus mod-
ifying it when we are studying it. In order to
comprehend the current discussion surrounding
the BDMA, we might need to view our work as
scholars as taking place within our own con-
structions (and theories) of addiction.
The perspective of being part of the phe-
nomenon we investigate can be understood
through the feminist theoretical concept of dif-
fraction, which questions the independence
and bounded nature of entities of study
objects. Quantum physicist and feminist theor-
ist Karen Barad articulates this position in her
agential realism theory partly inspired by the
work of Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Barad
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(2007) urges us to rethink how we understand
the relationship between discourse and materi-
ality in our research practices, analysis, and
presentation. According to Barad, when we
approach a phenomenon (describe it, measure
it, perform it, perceive it), we will inevitably
be involved in changing it, in forming and
affecting it. This involves the idea that there is
no ontological separation between the phenom-
enon and ideas that we research, on the one hand,
and our work as scholars, on the other.
When we make distinctions between subjec-
tive and objective “things” in different places at
different times, we do not uncover pre-existing
facts about independently existing things.Weour-
selves bring such “things” into existence by mak-
ing the distinctions. The shift towards seeing
ourselves as researchers as entangledandnot sepa-
rated from the phenomena of addiction involves
the view that we see the separations to the phe-
nomenon as becoming solidified through repeti-
tion of boundary-making practices or material
configurations of our own activity (Barad, 2007).
What, then, has been the boundary-making
practice of the addiction science field in the past
50 years or so? What sort of distinctions have
played a role in the materialisation of the sci-
entific object of addiction by the addiction
research field when seen together as a one mas-
sive field of knowledge production? The most
influential disciplinary traditions of addiction
science have moved within positivist
evidence-production of medicine, public
health, and psy sciences. They have involved
scientific practice that presents itself as stand-
ing at a distance measuring and representing.
Discussions that extend beyond proof-
producing and daily political matters have often
been seen as a fetish of small groups of sociol-
ogists and anthropologists in the margins. Such
a modus operandi may, at a certain point,
become so epistemologically homogenised that
the science field is no longer characterised by
objects, themes or concepts, but by a certain
style, a certain “constant manner of statement”
(cf. Foucault, 1972, p. 33). Might the BDMA
just be the next logical step in an area of research
that has structurally prioritised positivism over
metareflexivity of scientific practice? Science
production may have simply moved from
domains of counting andmeasuring human cases
and traits to the counting and measuring the
chemistry and architecture of the brain.
Seen in a socio-historical and an agential-
realist view, the critique of the BDMA from
within the addiction research field stems from
the same norm of credibility as is practised by
the proponents of the BDMA (or “the advocates
of the NIDA [National Institute of Drug
Abuse]”, as Fraser et al., 2014 refer to them).
As of yet, the discussion has not involved a
socio-historical self-reflexivity regarding the
ways in which its own distinctions between
subjective and objective “things” in different
places at different times have steered the pro-
gression towards the rise of the addicted brain.
To conclude
Massive amounts of funding are directed to
neurological research, and popular media repre-
sentations articulate on a daily basis great
excitement over the possibilities offered by brain-
based knowledge. Heather (2018) importantly
points out that no theory consisting of descrip-
tions of the activity of neurotransmitters,
synapses, and neural pathways can ever
amount to an adequate account of addiction.
To believe otherwise is to subscribe to “greedy
reductionism” (Heather, 2018). However, in
applying the two perspectives that I have sug-
gested,wemight end up concluding that our own
greedy reductionism has paved the way for tech-
nical brain-based solutions. As a research field,
we may have painted ourselves into a corner in
which we lack the instruments and concepts
needed to properly fight reductionism. In a Bar-
adian perspective, it might even be that the dis-
cussion that makes a distinction between
addiction being in the brain and not being in the
brain, as it stands, ends up serving the direct
opposite end than intended.
In this editorial, I have suggested two per-
spectives that I claim allow us to encapsulate
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positions of actors, power allocation and under-
standings over time in the ongoing discussion
on the BDMA. The first is to “step out” and
view the rise of the BDMA and its proponents
and critics from a socio-historical perspective.
The second is to “step in” to this epistemic tra-
jectory and pay attention to the diffraction pat-
terns that we ourselves perform in studying – and
at the same time affecting – the phenomenon of
addiction in different ways. If we neglect the
socio-historical perspective the debate risks
circling on the level of who is right about the
phenomenon’s nature, which relegates the socio-
political as external to epistemic practice.
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